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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

----------------------------------------------------------------DAVID W. JENSEN,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
-vs-

Case No. 16417

MOUNTAIN STATES TELEPHONE
AND TELEGRAPH COMPANY, a
corporation, and JOSE F.
GONZALES,
Defendants-Respondents.

APPELLANT'S BRIEF
Appeal From the Order of the Third Judicial
District Court for Salt Lake County
Honorable Christine M. Durham, Judge

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an action for damages for personal injury sustained by Plaintiff arising from a motor vehicle collision involving Plaintiff and Defendants.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
Defendant Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph
Company moved for sununary judgn1ent in this matter alleging it
was not negligent and if it was, its actions were not the proximate cause of Plaintiff's injury.

The lower court granted said

Defendant's motion for sununary judgment, no cause of action.
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The lower court certified the order granting summary judgment
under Rule 54(b), U.R.C.P. as a final judgment.

Plaintiff and

Defendant Gonzales have reached a settlement in this matter and
a stipulation and order of dismissal between said parties has
been filed in the lower court.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiff requests that this Court reverse the sununary
judgment granted in favor of Defendant Mountain States Telephone
and Telegraph Company and that the case be remanded to the trial
court for the purposes of a trial on the merits in this matter.
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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On September 8, 1977 Plaintiff was traveling north on
State Road 111 on a motorcycle and approaching the intersection
of State Road 171.

Plaintiff regularly passed through this inter-

section on his way to work for the past three years and it was
Plaintiff's habit and custom to drive 50 miles per hour on the
highway and slow to 30 miles per hour as he passed through the
intersection (Jensen depo. pp. 8,59,60)

At approximately the

same time, Defendant Gonzales was in the process of executing a
left hand turn from Hightway 111 and attempting to proceed east
on Highway 171, at which time Plaintiff collided with Defendant
Gonzales' vehicle.

On this particular occasion, Defendant Moun-

tain States Telephone and Telegraph Company (Mountain Bell) had
parked a van-type truck, 18 feet long by 8 feet wide directly
in the center of the intersection.

(Sortino depo. pp. 15,33,28)

The employee of Defendant Mountain Bell who parked the truck was
aware that a person making a left hand turn as Defendant Gonzales
did would have his view obstructed.

(Sortino depo. p. 30)

De-

fendant Mountain Bell provided no signs, flagmen or other devises
to warn Defendant Gonzales that he was approaching a hazardous
situation.

(Gonzales depo. pp. 8, 29)

As Defendant Gonzales

came to the intersection and moved into the left hand turn lane
he was unable to see traffic approaching in the opposite direction
because of Defendant Mountain Bell's truck being parked in the
center of the intersection, although he would have been able to
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see Plaintiff approaching had said truck not been so parked,
(Gonzales depo. pp. 29,30)

While proceeding slowly beyond

Mountain Bell's truck far enough to see approaching traffic,
Defendant Gonzales had moved his vehicle into the approaching
path of Plaintiff and a collision between Plaintiff and Defendant Gonzales occurred.

(Gonzales depo. p. 14)
ARGUMENT
POINT I

APPELLANT'S BURDEN ON APPEAL,
In order for the moving party to prevail on a motion
for sununary judgment, it must show that the evidence presented,
when viewed in a light most favorable to the opposing party, does
not present a material issue of fact, and that the evidence so
viewed entitles the moving party to have his motion granted as
a matter of law.

This test is well settled in Utah and expressed

in many cases including Controlled Receivables, Inc. vs. Harman,
17 Utah 2d, 420 (1966)

413 P.2d 807.

The Appellant's burden on appeal is to show that the
evidence presented to the lower court, viewed most favorably
for the Appellant, presents a material issue of fact which must
be resolved to determine the liability of Mountain Bell.
POINT II
STATEMENT OF THE EVIDENCE RELATING TO THE
NEGLIGENCE OF DEFENDANT MOUNTAIN BELL.
Defendant Mountain Bell's motion for summary judgment
was argued in the lower court without the presence of a cour:
reporter.

Therefore no transcript of the hearing exists althou~i
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the transcript of the subsequent hearing on Plaintiff's motion
to alter or amend the summary judgment is a part of the record
on appeal.

At both hearings, it was conceded by the attorney for

Defendant Mountain Bell, that for purposes of summary judgment,
it was conceded that Mountain Bell was negligent and the arguments
presented were solely related to the issue of proximate cause.
(Tr. Plaintiff's Motion to Amend Judgment, p. 2, ln. 20-27)
Although the negligence of Defendant Mountain Bell was
conceded for purposes of said Defendant's summary judgment motion,
the alleged negligent acts of Mountain Bell will be briefly set
out in this brief.

Like any other individual or entity, Defend-

ant Mountain Bell has a duty to exercise reasonable care for the
safety of others during the conduct of its business as a public
utility.

The breach of that duty consists of Mountain Bell's

action of placing its truck directly in the center of the intersection, blocking the view of Defendant Gonzales, Plaintiff and
other traffic.

In so parking its truck, Defendant Mountain Bell

created a dangerous condition recognized by Utah law:
"The parking of a vehicle upon the paved
or traveled portion of a highway is generally
regarded as a hazard to traffic thereon."
Hillyard v. Utah By-Products Co., 1 Utah
2d 143, 147; 263 P.2d 287, 290 (1953)
In addition to the hazardous situation created, Defendant Mountain Bell failed to take the precautions required by law
and its truck was therefore illegally parked.

Defendant Mountain

Bell provided no warning devices to advise Defendant Gonzales of
the danger.

Defendant ~ountain Bell provided no flagmen to
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control traffic at the intersection, although flagmen could have
been so used and were, in fact, used at that location by Mountain Bell the following day.
Pursuant to the rule making power of the Utah State
Road Conunission, the Utah manual for Construction and Maintenance Traffic Control was adopted on July 14, 1972.

The relevant

portions of that manual are attached to Plaintiff's memorandum
in opposition to Defendant's motion for summary judgment.

Sec-

tion 6-05.1 of the manual requires that all traffic control devices used on highway construction and maintenance work shall
conform to the specifications in the manual.

The portion of the

manual entitled "Typical Applications" contains the required
traffic control devices for utility operations.

Defendant

Moun~

tain Bell did not provide the warning signs as required by the
manual.

The manual requires that operations which restrict ve-

hicular movement, so that traffic in both directions must use
a single lane, shall only be allowed while flagmen are on duty
or when a temporary traffic signal is installed to assign rightof-way.

Mountain Bell neither provided a flagman nor installed

such a traffic signal, although vehicles in both directions were
required to use a single lane due to the position of Mountain
Bell's truck parked on the highway.

(Sortino depo. p. 28,29)

The manual further provides that for operation within
50 feet of an intersection, traffic control plans shall be
approved by the district engineer for the Department of Highways.
(Sortino depo. p. 62,63)

Defendant Mountain Bell obtained no
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such approval.
Because of the foregoing acts and omissions of Defendant Mountain Bell, said Defendant breached its duty to Plaintiff
creating a dangerous condition and by not taking the precautions
required by law for the safety of those traveling upon a public
highway.

The deposition of Mountain Bell's employee, Terry A.

Sortino, states that Mountain Bell's truck was in fact parked
in the center of the intersection blocking the view of traffic.
(pp. 15,28,30,33)
This evidence being before the lower court created
an issue of fact as to the negligence of Mountain Bell.
POINT III
WHETHER OR NOT DEFENDANT MOUNTAIN BELL'S NEGLIGENCE
WAS A PROXIMATE CAUSE OF PLAINTIFF'S INJURY IS
A QUESTION OF FACT TO BE RESOLVED AT TRIAL.
Defendant Mountain Bell contends that because Defendant
Gonzales made a left turn in front of Plaintiff, that the negligence of Defendant Gonzales was the intervening proximate cause
of Plaintiff's injuries; and, therefore, the negligence of Mountain Bell was not a proximate cause of Plaintiff's injuries.
However, the risk created by Mountain Bell in obstructing the
intersection included the foreseeable negligence of Defendant
Gonzales.

The court in Watters v. Querry, 588 P.2d 702 (1978)

refused to uphold jury instruction which read, in pertinent part,
as follows:
"If a
with
such
able

driver creates a dangerous condition
a motor vehicle, but his condition is
that another driver, exercising reasoncare, should have observed and avoided
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the dangerous condition, then the negligence
of the latter driver is an independent
intervening cause, and, therefore, the
first driver cannot be a proximate cause
of the collision."
The facts in Watters consisted of defendant's automobile stopping
abruptly in front of the plaintiff, and although plaintiff was
able to stop without colliding with that defendant, a vehicle
following plaintiff was unable to stop and collided with the
rear of plaintiff.

The court in considering the defendant's

liability for the collision with the rear of plaintiff's vehicle,
rejected the above jury instruction and stated the following
rule:
"The more fundamental test is whether under
the particular circumstances he should have
foreseen that his conduct would have exposed
others to an unreasonable risk of harm; and
this includes situations where negligence or
other wrongful conduct of others should be
reasonably anticipated."
Applied to the case at hand, the question becomes
whether or not Defendant Mountain Bell should have foreseen that
its conduct would have exposed Plaintiff to the unreasonable risk
of Defendant Gonzales moving into the path of Plaintiff because
his vision was obstructed.
Before the accident occurred, Defendant Mountain Bell's
employee Sortino, during a 30 minute period, saw six vehicles
traveling east and driving around the front of Defendant Mountain
Bell's truck.

(Sortino depo. p. 36)

Defendant Mountain Bell

was therefore fully aware that motorists proceeding easterly in
the intersection were doing so even though said Defendant MounSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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tain Bell's truck obstructed their view of oncoming traffic.
(Sortino depo. pp. 28-30)

While it could be argued that every

such motorist was negligent, it can not be said that the subsequent conduct of Defendant Gonzales in repeating what other
drivers were doing was unforseen by Mountain Bell.
The case of Hillyard v. Utah By-Products Co., 1 Utah
2d 143, 263 P.2d 287 (1953) is in accord with Watters and the
court at page 148,9 cites with approval the following rule of law:
"The earlier of the two wrongdoers, even
though his worng has merely set the stage
on which the later wrongdoer acts to the
plaintiff's injury, is in most jurisdictions no longer relieved from responsibility
merely because the later act of the other
wrongdoer has been a means by which his
own misconduct was made harmful. The test
has come to be whether the later act, which
realized the harmful potentialities of
the situation created by the defendant,
was itself foreseeable."
The facts in Hillyard
that it

involved Defenant's truck being parked so

protruded onto the highway.

Plaintiff negligently failed

to see the truck and Plaintiff's vehicle ran into the truck.
court in applying the above rule of law to the fact situation
stated:
"If, however, the evidence is susceptible
of any reasonable interpretation which would
permit a finding th~t as [plaintiff] approached
the scene, his view was so obstructed by the
cars he was following and passing that at
the time the third car turned to its left
to miss the truck the latter loomed up
before him as an emergent situation, then,
even though he was negligen~ in getti~g
into such a predicament, a JUry ~uestion.
would exist as to whether the prior negligent parking of [defenda~ts] truck.was
also a concurring cause.
(emphasis added)
1 Utah
2dQuinney
at Law
152
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The

Applied to the case at hand, even though Defendant Gonzales was
negligent in proceeding when his view was obstructed, a jury
question exists as to whether Defendant Mountain Bell's prior
negligent parking of its truck was a concurring cause of Plaintiff's injuries,
POINT IV
THE LOWER COURT COMMITTED REVERSABLE ERROR
BY NOT VIEWING THE EVIDENCE BEFORE IT IN
A LIGHT MOST FAVORABLE TO PLAINTIFF.
At the hearing of Plaintiff's motion to amend judgment,
the court made the following corrunents concerning the granting of
the summary judgment:
"I do have one concern, Mr. Roberts, and that
is:
In granting the summary judgment, I did
so on the basis and the understanding that
there were no material disputed issues of
fact, and my determination of that was based
upon my understanding of the evidence in the
case, which was that the defendant Gonzales,
knowing that he could not see around the
truck, made an attempt to complete a left
hand trun.
If, in fact, he attempted to
get a better view by inching out around
the truck, my view of the facts would have
been entirely different."
(p. 12, ln. 5-14)
The court stated that its view of the case regarding the actions
of Mountain Bell and the question of proximate cause depended
on a determination of whether Defendant Gonzales attempted to
complete a turn knowing he could not see around Mountain Bell's
truck, or whether Defendant Gonzales attempted to get a better
view by inching out around the truck.

Such a slight distinction

in the interpretation of the facts was not a proper determination
for the trial court on a summary judgment motion.

The evidence
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before the court consisted of the deposition of Defendant Gonzales
wherein he stated as follows:

"Q. After you stopped you told me a few minutes
ago that you came to a full stop because there
was some sort of traffic sign controlling you
and that your vision was blocked. Then what
did you do?
A. Then I proceeded slow until I cleared this
utility truck enough so I could see what was
coming from the south."
(p. 11, ln. 25-p. 12
ln. 5)
The court in construing the statements of Defendant Gonzales
made a determination that he attempted to complete a left hand
turn as opposed to inching out around the truck, a determination which the court thought was central to its decision.

If

any such determination was proper for the court, a view of the
facts allowing Plaintiff to go to trial would be the only way
to resolve conflicts in the facts on summary judgment.
The lower court further made a determination that the
actions of Defendant Gonzales were, as a matter of law, negligent
and more over the type of negligence that Mountain Bell could not
have foreseen under any circumstance.

Plaintiff respectfully

submits that a determination of the foreseeability of the actions
of Defendant Gonzales is an issue of fact which should not have
been determined by the trial court.

At the hearing on Plaintiff's

motion to amend judgment the court made the following statements:
"I agree with you, Mr. Dibblee, that the question
in this case is whether or not Mountain Bell should
have foreseen Gonzales' negligence is one of
fact.
I determined in the negative, i.e., it
was a question of law based on the facts that
were before me and the evidence that the kind of
negligence that is engaged in by Gonzales in
making that turn when he literally had no view
and knew he had no view, in other words, he was
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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fully apprised of the hazard, was the kind of
negligence that Mountain Bell could not have
foreseen under any circumstance.
In other words,
they have no reason to believe that a driver who
knows he doesn't have a view is going to attempt
to cross two lanes of traffic in the absence of
that view."
(p. 13, ln. 7-19)
Plaintiff submits that the deposition of Mountain Bell employee
Sortino is evidence that Defendant Gonzales' conduct was forseeable.

In that deposition Mr. Sortino stated:

"Q. The position that your truck was in, a
person traveling intending to get in the
left hand lane of traffic to make a left
turn, their view would be obstructed, is
that not true?
A. Partially.
Q. Your were aware of that?
A. Yes. n
(p, 30 ln, 1 - 7)
"Q. How many cars drove around the front of
your car while you were sitting there at
lunch?
A. Around the front of the van?
Q. Yes, going east.
A. In 30 minutes I would probably
say half a dozen."
(p. 36 ln. 5 - 9)
The statements of Mountain Bell employee Sortino concern his
observations and activities prior to the collision, and indicate
that traffic was proceeding through the intersection in spite of
the fact that Mountain Bell's van had created an obstruction of
vision in the intersection.

It could be argued that all such

drivers proceeding through the intersection were negligent but
even if so, Mountain Bell was aware that traffic was so proceeding
and the action thereafter of Defendant Gonzales in pulling his
vehicle just beyond Mountain Bell's van to get a better view,
cannot be said to be an unforeseeable event.

To rule tll.a t Defend-

ant Gonzales' actions were unforeseeable as a matter of law
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required the lower court to disregard or give no weight to the
evidence presented in Mr. Sortino's deposition.

Plaintiff re-

spectfully submits that such a view or weighing of the evidence
on summary judgment is an improper function of the trial court
and reversible error.
CONCLUSION
Plaintiff received severe injuries as a result of the
hazardous situation created.

In a negligence action such as this,

the issues of negligence and proximate cause must be determined
by the trier of fact after each party has introduced and developed
the evidence supporting his case.

Plaintiff submits that to de-

termine the issue of proximate cause by holding that the actions
of Defendant Gonzales were not foreseeable as a matter of law,

is an invasion of the province of the fact finder.

Plaintiff

has presented a prima facie case showing that Defendant Mountain
Bell created a hazardous situation by blocking the view of traffic
and Plaintiff has further demonstrated through the deposition of
Mountain Bell employee Sortino that Mountain Bell was aware that
traffic was proceeding through the intersection in spite of the
hazard.

Plaintiff respectfully submits that he is entitled to

a trial on the issues of negligence and foreseeability and requests
that the Court remand this case to the lower court for that purpose.
Respectfully submitted,
ROBERTS, BLACK & DIBBLEE

By JAMES R. SOPER
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant
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